Paper · arXiv 2602.10465 · Feb 2026
Authenticated Workflows
A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI
MACAW is built on published research in distributed systems security. Our core insight: instead of trying to detect AI attacks (which doesn’t work), we bound agentic systems deterministically using the same cryptographic techniques that secure distributed systems. The result: breaking your AI requires breaking cryptography, not crafting clever prompts.
We’re building in the open. If you’re a practitioner or researcher working on agentic AI security, we’d love to connect.
| Date | Type | Title | Description | Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 2026 | Briefing | Deterministic Controls for Autonomous Agents: Lessons from Securing Claude Code | Attacks are infinite, effects are finite. Why sandboxing, enumeration and LLM judges fail against an agent like Claude Code, and how secCC enforces policy on what commands do. | |
| Nov 2026 | Guide | MAPL Policy Guide | Complete tutorial for the MACAW Agentic Policy Language. Policy structure, inheritance, parameter constraints, attestations, claim-based attestations, chained invocations, object policies, and extractors, verifiers and processors. Version 3.7.1. | |
| Jun 2026 | Tech blog | The Missing Layer in SOTA AI Controls | Anthropic and Google DeepMind both hit the same wall: detection-based AI controls have a non-zero miss rate and don't scale with agent autonomy. The missing layer is a deterministic, bounded trust layer — enforced at effect boundaries, not chasing infinite patterns. | |
| Jun 2026 | Analysis | Convergence Analysis: Mapping MACAW to SOTA AI Control Gaps | How MACAW’s deterministic controls map to the gaps and open problems identified by Anthropic and Google DeepMind. Companion to the note “The Missing Layer in SOTA AI Controls.” | |
| Apr 2026 | White paper | SecureMCP: The Production Layer for MCP | Identity, policy, audit, and observability for MCP servers. Solving the shared context problem with per-invocation isolation. | |
| Mar 2026 | White paper | The Inline Gateway Pattern | Why inline gateways are architecturally superior to centralized gateways for agentic AI. SecureMCPProxy, SecureOpenAI, and the unified trust layer. | |
| Feb 2026 | White paper | Zero Trust Agentic Identity | The missing infrastructure layer for enterprise AI. Why traditional identity fails for AI agents. | |
| Feb 2026 | Paper | Authenticated Workflows: A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI | The foundational paper. Why detection-based AI security fails, how to bound agentic systems deterministically, and the four attack surfaces (prompts, tools, data, context) that cover all attack vectors. | |
| Feb 2026 | Paper | Protecting Context and Prompts: Deterministic Security for Non-Deterministic AI | How to make prompts and context cryptographically authentic. Lineage tracking for derived prompts, hash-chained context for tamper-evidence, and why permissions can only narrow as workflows execute. | |
| Feb 2026 | Architecture | Identity Flow Architecture | MACAW’s layered identity architecture. How JWT tokens flow through adapters and clients with multi-user isolation. | |
| Feb 2026 | Reference | Claims Mapping Reference | Mapping enterprise identity provider claims to MACAW’s policy model. Examples for Keycloak, Okta, Azure AD, and Google. | |
| Feb 2026 | Guide | Delegated Authentication | How AI agents act on behalf of users with scoped permissions, audit trails, and cryptographic verification. | |
| Feb 2026 | Tech blog | Securing AI Agents: We've Solved This Problem Before | The core challenge is that you can't enumerate every malicious prompt. But we've solved this exact class of problem before in distributed systems—by defining what IS allowed and enforcing it at the boundaries. | |
| Oct 2025 | Tech blog | Fault Lines: Semantic Cracks in AI's Foundation -- Insights from Analyzing 100 MCP servers | In analyzing over 100 MCP repos, we discovered vulnerabilities traditional tools miss -- flaws that live not in code, but how AI systems are architected, reason and interpret natural language prompts | |
| Sep 2025 | Tech blog | Setting boundaries : Getting Zero Trust Tool Calling Right For Agentic AI | Establishing security boundaries when the LLM tool calling attack surface is expanding faster than solutions can keep up | |
| Jun 2025 | Tech blog | The Agentic Security Paradigm Shift: Why Traditional Tools Fail and How to Protect Autonomous AI | Security teams are trying to wrap yesterday's controls around today's AI agents—and it's not working. The gap between product security and security products will only be exaggerated by agentic AI. | |
| Jun 2025 | Tech blog | Why Reactive Security Has Reached Its Limits: The Emerging Threat Landscape in Agentic AI | Exploring why traditional reactive security approaches are inadequate for AI agents that can autonomously compromise systems at machine speed | |
| v1.2.2 | Benchmark | AgentDojo: 0 of 949 injected attacks took effect | ETH Zurich’s prompt-injection benchmark, run unchanged with every tool call routed through MACAW. gpt-4o on its own carried out 184 of 389. | |
| v2.0.0 | Benchmark | τ²-bench: 36 of 36 rule-breaking calls refused | Does the agent keep to the company’s written policy? τ²-bench (ICML 2026), with the policy enforced by MACAW. τ²’s own tools would have run 19 of them. |